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Abstract 
Age structure and its dynamics are critical in understanding the impact of population 
growth on a country‟s growth prospects. Using state-level data from India, we show that 
the pace of demographic transition varies across states, and that these differences are 
likely to be exacerbated over the period 2011-2026. We show that the so-called BIMARU 
states (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) are likely to see a 
continuing increase in the share of the working-age population in total population. The 
BIMARU states are expected to contribute 58% of the increase in India‟s working-age 
population. The BIMARU states have traditionally been the slow-growing states and 
have performed poorly on different accounts of social and physical infrastructure. 
Whether India can turn demographic dividend into a boon or whether the dividend will 
become a bane will critically depend on the ability of the BIMARU states to exploit the 
bulge in the working-age population. 
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1. Introduction 
Social scientists have long argued over the impact of population growth on economic 
growth. The debate has oscillated from the “pessimistic view,” which argued that the 
population growth restricts economic development (credited largely to Malthus), to the 
“optimistic view,” which argued that population growth fuels economic growth (for 
example, Kuznets 1967). The debate seemed to have finally settled in favor of the 
“neutralist view,” i.e., population growth does not matter for growth prospects.  
 
Bloom and Williamson (1998) argued that the earlier debate missed a critical dimension 
of the population dynamics, namely, the changing age structure. According to this view, 
as countries pass through various phases of demographic transition from high fertility and 
high mortality to low mortality and low fertility, the age composition of a country‟s 
population changes. During this demographic transition, all countries have a demographic 
“window of opportunity” when the growth in the working-age population is greater than 
the growth in the total population. This bulge in the working-age population, i.e., the 
increase in the share of the working-age population in total population, is referred to as 
the “demographic dividend.” 
 
Using cross-country data, Bloom and Williamson (1998), Bloom et al. (2002), among 
others, show a positive relationship between the growth rate of the share of the working-
age population and economic growth.
1
 At some point, all countries are likely to 
experience demographic transition. However, whether or not the window of opportunity 
is utilized, as noted by Bloom et al. (2002), will depend on the policy environment. This 
is the first strand of literature to which this paper relates, i.e., the studies examining the 
role of the changing age structure of the population in economic growth. Change in the 
age composition matters because different age groups have different economic behavior. 
For example, a population with a greater share of the 0-14 age group will spend a greater 
share of income on the upbringing of the young and will therefore save less. Similarly, a 
population with a greater share of the elderly population, i.e. 65 and up, will see greater 
spending on health care and pensions. On the other hand, a working-age (15-64 age 
group) population in general tends to be more productive, supplies labor, saves more than 
their consumption, and provides capital for investment. A differing share of the working-
age population across countries can have a differing impact on economic growth. 
 
India has often been singled out as being in the midst of a demographic boom since the 
1980s and one of the few countries expected to see an increase in the share of the 
working-age population until about 2035 to 2040. In this paper, we go beneath the 
surface and show that the aggregate picture masks significant differences in the 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this paper wherever we refer to the share of the working-age population, it is with respect to 
the total population, unless otherwise specified. 
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demographic transition across states in India. We first investigate the relationship 
between economic growth and growth in the share of the working-age population in the 
context of India using state-level data. We find that, controlling for state characteristics 
and initial per capita income, states with a higher growth in the share of the working-age 
population in total population grow faster over time.  
 
Using official population projections for the period 2001-2026, we show that differences 
in demographic transition across states are likely to be exacerbated in the future. On the 
one hand, some states such as Kerala and Tamil Nadu will start seeing a decline in the 
share of the working-age population during the period 2011-2026. On the other hand, 
states such as BIhar, MAdhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh (known collectively 
as the BIMARU states), which are the slowest in their demographic transition, will 
continue to see an increase in the share of the working-age population.
2
  
 
There is lot of optimism about the potential of a huge labor supply, and rightly so. 
However, Acharya (2004) notes that this represents only one side of the story, the supply 
side. The other aspect is the demand side and the ability to provide additional labor 
supply with gainful jobs. The BIMARU states have been the slowest in their 
demographic transition and are among the slowest-growing states (as measured by 
growth in per capita income). BIMARU states, as shown in this paper, are expected to 
contribute as much as 58% of the increase in India‟s working-age population. We argue 
that whether India will be able to make the most of the projected increase in labor supply 
will rest critically on the ability of the BIMARU states to provide complementary 
conditions for growth and generate gainful employment opportunities. The failure of 
these states to create conducive conditions for providing the additional labor supply with 
gainful employment has the potential to turn the demographic boon into a bane. 
 
Though there is ample literature discussing cross-country experiences of demographic 
transition and its implications for growth (see for example, Bloom and Williamson 
(1998) and Bloom and Canning (2004)), there is little literature on differences in 
demographic transition across regions within a country. However, there has been a keen 
interest in the demographic trends across states in India (for example, Bose (1996), Bhat 
(2001), Visaria and Visaria (2003), Mitra and Nagarajan (2005), Bose (2006), 
Chandrashekhar et al. (2006), and James (2008)). This is the second strand of literature 
with which this paper is closely connected. All these studies, as well as this paper, use 
                                                 
2
 BIMARU is a variation of the Hindi word bimar, meaning ill. The BIMARU states are so nicknamed for 
their lack of economic growth, high population growth rates, and their inability to undertake a successful 
transition from high-birth and high-death rates to low-birth and low-death rates. Given that these states 
accounted for 40% of India‟s population in the past, the poor economic performance in these states has 
proved to be a drag on the overall growth performance. 
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historical data to bring out the imbalances in demographic transition across regions and 
states in India, and draw policy implications. Bhat (2001) and Bose (2006) use 
demographic projections to 2025 and 2026 respectively to show that the “north-south” 
imbalance in the demographic transition is likely to continue. However, they do so only 
at a very aggregate “region” level. In this paper, we use official projections to analyze 
which states in India are expected to see an increase in the share of the working-age 
population. We also show the contribution of each of the states to the expected increase 
in India‟s working-age population. This will help identify the states that will account for 
a lion‟s share of the increase in India‟s working-age population. We discuss whether 
these states will be able to exploit the demographic window of opportunity.  
 
Visaria and Visaria (2003), using the 1991 census as the base, provide population 
projections for major states up to 2101. They argue that the difference in fertility and 
mortality rates will manifest themselves in differences in the pace of demographic 
transition and that the BIMARU states, Assam, Haryana, and Orissa will take 10 to 15 
years longer to complete their demographic transition. They discuss the projected 
differences in age composition of the population across states in terms of dependency 
ratios—i.e., the ratio of number of dependents (those in the 0-14 and 65-plus age groups) 
to the working-age population. In this paper, the focus is on the anticipated differences 
across states in the share of working-age population and its growth, as well as the 
contribution of different states to the overall increase in India‟s working-age population. 
 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, James (2008) is the only paper to have examined 
this relationship between growth and population-age structure in the context of India. 
However, James (2008) focuses on the growth in the working-age population and not the 
growth in the share of the working-age population. The latter variable is what captures 
the demographic dividend. We include this variable directly in our estimation.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept of 
demographic dividend and the channels through which it affects economic growth. 
Section 3 compares the demographic trends in India from an international perspective. 
Section 4 provides a discussion of historical demographic trends in India and different 
states. Section 5 examines the relationship between economic growth and growth in the 
share of the working-age population. Section 6 discusses state-level population projection 
trends in India and draws policy implications. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Demography and economic growth 
 
 
The relationship between population growth and economic growth has long interested 
demographers, economists, and policymakers alike. Different strands of thought have 
shaped the debate at different points of time. The early days of this debate were 
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dominated by the Malthusian view, according to which, population growth will impede 
economic development. A rapidly growing population is likely to need more resources 
and this could crowd out capital expenditure, resulting in lower capital per worker, which 
will have an adverse impact on labor productivity and therefore, on living standards. 
Another argument was that if the growth in population exceeds that of food production, 
malnutrition will prevail and force many to live on a below-subsistence diet, which will 
negatively affect the health of the workforce and therefore, their productivity. Also, 
impoverishment may result in a high death rate, bringing an end to high population 
growth. 
 
Bloom et al. (2002) contend that the “starvation of millions” that was feared never 
happened and, despite population growth, per capita incomes increased. This gave rise to 
the second view in the debate on population growth and economic development. This 
view argued that population growth assisted economic growth (Simon Kuznets, 1967).
3
 
According to this school of thought, an increase in population comes with an increase in 
the stock of human capital. This, combined with the pressure to invent when faced with 
the possibility of dire outcomes, leads to population growth assisting economic 
development. 
 
At the same time, those arguing in favor of a positive impact of population growth on 
economic growth were also mindful of the role of country-specific features that can have 
an impact on growth. This paved the way for the middle path, according to which, 
population change has no significant effect on economic growth. According to this view, 
once country characteristics are taken into account, there is little evidence that population 
growth has an adverse impact on economic growth. 
 
More recently, Bloom and Williamson (1998), Bloom et al. (2002), and Bloom and 
Canning (2004), argue that the debate on population growth and economic growth 
seemed to have missed a critical dimension of population dynamics—the changing age 
structure. They argue that population growth comes with a change in the age 
composition, and this assumes importance because different age groups have different 
economic behavior. All countries are likely to see this change in the age composition of 
their population. This change in age structure will be magnified in some countries as 
compared to other countries, which in turn will depend on the speed of demographic 
transition. 
 
Demographic transition is the shift from high mortality and fertility rates to low mortality 
and fertility rates. This shift is commonly described in three phases. The first phase of the 
demographic transition is characterized by high mortality and fertility rates. 
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 Also see Simon (1981). 
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A decline in mortality marks the beginning of the second phase. Early mortality declines 
are greatest among infants and children, thus causing a surge in the numbers of surviving 
children and an increase in the proportion of the population in the childhood ages.  The 
population age structure at first becomes younger. A decline in mortality increases the 
chances of survival of the young, as well as their life expectancy. With children more 
likely to survive and live longer, parents are less likely to want to have more children, 
leading to a decline in fertility, and instead, invest their resources in fewer children. In 
other words, there is a decline in the “quantity” of children and an increase in the 
“quality” of children.  
 
However, in a typical demographic transition, fertility decline follows mortality 
decline—but only after one generation or about two decades. Thus, the entry into the 
third and the last phase of the demographic transition, to low mortality and fertility, 
comes with a lag. The transition from the second to the third phase is accompanied by 
rapid population growth. The second phase of the demographic transition sees major 
changes in the age structure. Early on in the second phase, with mortality declining more 
among the young, the proportion of the under-15 population in total population is very 
large. After fertility begins to decline, the subsequent child cohorts start shrinking as a 
proportion of the population. Meanwhile, as the earlier huge cohorts enter adult life, the 
share of the working-age population (15-64) in the total population swells. This leads to a 
baby-boom generation, which will have echo effects for several generations as they enter 
the reproductive years. This increase in the share of the working-age population in total 
population is referred to as the “demographic dividend.” 
 
Delivering the demographic dividend 
Age structure and its evolution over time are important because the economic behavior of 
individuals varies over their life-cycle, which, when aggregated across the entire 
population, has different implications for the overall growth of an economy. For example, 
the young require intensive investment in education and health, working-age adults 
supply labor and savings, and the aged require more health care and provision for 
retirement. There are various channels through which a growing share of the working-age 
population in total population can have a positive impact on an economy‟s growth 
prospects.  
 
The first channel through which an increase in the working-age population can positively 
affect economic growth is through an increase in labor supply. As the demographic 
transition shifts from the first stage to the second stage, the baby-boom generation enters 
the working ages of 15-64, the number of people who would like to work increases, and 
conditional on there being enough demand in the labor markets, per capita production 
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increases. Labor supply might also increase because of behavioral changes, though this is 
to some extent dependent on cultural norms. This happens because of the possibility of a 
higher entry of women into the workforce as the family size declines. Over time, the 
probability of women themselves being brought up in small families and having an 
education increases.
4
   
 
Second, the demographic dividend provides an impetus to growth through savings in both 
an accounting sense as well as in a behavioral way. An important difference in the 
economic behavior of the various age groups is that while the young and the old consume 
more than they produce, the reverse is true for the working-age population. As a result, 
the working-age group also has a higher level of savings. The effect on savings is likely 
to be more pronounced from 40 to 65, when the working-age group is less likely to be 
investing in children, more likely to be engaged in preparing for retirement, and therefore 
likely to be saving more. Improvements in public health and medicine, which increase 
life expectancy, as well as a smaller family size, make savings more important. A higher 
share of the population in the working-age group will therefore result in more savings, 
which can provide capital to fund new investment. 
 
The third is through an increase in the stock of human capital. An increase in the share of 
the working-age population comes with a decline in mortality and fertility as well as a 
higher life expectancy. With parents choosing to have fewer children who are likely to 
live longer, they can afford to give more attention and invest more in fewer children. 
They are more likely to invest in their children‟s education and health. A higher life 
expectancy and a longer working life also translate into a higher probability of recovering 
the investment. Bloom et al. (2002) note that the impact on growth through 
improvements in human capital is the “most significant and is the least tangible.” 
Increased educational investment translates into a more productive workforce as and 
when the baby-boomers start working, which in turn results in higher wages and therefore 
a higher standard of living. 
 
The demographic window alone is not sufficient 
It is inevitable that all countries that undergo demographic transition from high mortality 
and fertility to low mortality and fertility will see an increase in the share of the working-
age population. However, this demographic window is at best an opportunity and does 
not automatically guarantee that full use will be made of the opportunity. The presence of 
complementary policies and institutions influences a country‟s ability to realize as well as 
exploit the demographic dividend. These policies can be classified into various 
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 Cultural norms themselves may change over time as family size becomes smaller, life expectancy 
increases, and parents invest more in their children, both girls and boys. These factors may interact over a 
long enough period of time to change cultural norms. 
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categories: health, population and family planning, labor markets, macroeconomic, 
financial, and education.  
 
A key determinant of when a country enters the demographic transition is the decline in 
mortality, which depends on improvements in public health and medicine. The 
importance of health, however, does not end here. There is increasing evidence showing 
that health is a key determinant of economic outcomes. Along with public health, 
population policy and family planning-related health policies can influence the timing of 
the decline in fertility, and the speed with which a country enters and exits the 
demographic transition. Investment in human capital is an important channel through 
which the demographic dividends can be reaped. Transforming a youthful population into 
a productive workforce will require investment in education at all levels. 
 
The demographic dividend can be turned into real gains only if the working-age 
population can find productive jobs or entrepreneurial opportunities to create jobs. 
Government policies that help create conducive macroeconomic conditions are important 
for the growth of productive and rewarding jobs. A healthy degree of flexibility in labor 
markets and openness to trade are other policy areas that can help reap benefits from the 
demographic dividend. A higher share of the working-age population, who save more 
than they consume, can potentially lead to an increase in the savings of an economy and 
provide the required financing for investment. However, to encourage savings and to 
allocate them efficiently require a healthy macroeconomic environment, a sound financial 
system, and good governance to ensure the safety and profitability of savings. 
 
The demographic dividend along with the right policy environment can help create a 
“virtuous cycle” of sustained growth. Policymakers in countries with demographic 
dividend have a window of opportunity for exploiting the potential of the working-age 
populations. However, this window is unlikely to be open for long. Not implementing the 
right set of policies can potentially turn the demographic boon into a curse, in the form of 
high unemployment and social unrest. 
  
3. India’s window of opportunity: An international perspective 
Before looking at the demographic transition across states in India, we examine how far 
India is in the process of demographic transition when compared with other developed 
and developing countries. Figure 1 shows the share of the working-age population, ages 
15-64, in the total population from 1950 to 2050. The countries shown can be divided 
into three groups. 
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Figure 1: India’s demographic transition in an international perspective 
 
Source: UN population projections. Note: Eastern Europe includes Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, and Ukraine. SE Asia 
(Southeast Asia) comprises of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People‟s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam.  
 
The first group consists of advanced economies, such as Japan, Western Europe, the UK, 
and the USA, which are already past the peak in the share of the working-age group in 
total population. A sharp decline is already underway in Japan and Western Europe. In 
the case of the UK and the USA, however, the share of the working age is projected to 
decline relatively slowly before stabilizing in the range of 60-65%. The projected 
increase in the share of the old-age population in total population in the advanced 
economies will have implications for fiscal policy. This will require planning in advance 
to meet the challenges of spending on pensions/social security as well as higher 
expenditure on health care. 
 
The second group comprises countries such as China, Russia, and Eastern European 
countries where the share of the working-age population in total population is expected to 
continue increasing before they start declining around 2015. Compared to the advanced 
economies, the decline in the second group is not as sharp and the share of the working-
age population in total population is projected to remain above 60%.  
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The third group includes Brazil and other Latin American countries, and Southeast Asian 
(SE Asia) countries along with Turkey (not shown), which are projected to see an 
increase in the share of the working-age population until the mid-2020s before declining. 
Like the countries in the second group, the decline is not as sharp and the share of the 
working-age group in total population remains above 60%. 
 
Lastly, there is India, where the share of the working-age population in total population is 
expected to continue increasing until about 2035 to 2040, before starting a slow decline. 
The share of the working-age population in India is expected to remain above 65% until 
2050. India‟s window of opportunity to exploit the growing share of the working-age 
population in total population is among the longest. India thus seems to be sitting on a 
huge opportunity in terms of a boom in the share of the working-age population. 
 
4. Demographic trends in India: A state-level perspective
5
  
In the previous section, we have seen that India‟s demographic window of opportunity 
extends until about 2035 to 2040. However, this masks differences in the pace of 
demographic transition across states in India. We start with a discussion of key statistics 
at the all-India level and then turn to discussing the differing pace of demographic 
transition across the states in India. 
 
For purposes of consistency with the rest of the paper, which uses Census of India data, 
Table 1 presents key demographic trends and vital statistics in India for the period 1951-
2001. The average annual growth rate of the total population was 2.24% during 1961-
1971, slowing down to 1.97% during the census period 1991-2001. Crude birth rate 
(CBR) fell from 41.7 in 1951 to 37.2 in 1971, and to 25.4 in 2001. Crude death rate 
(CDR) declined from 22.8 in 1951 to 15 in 1971, and to 7.4 in 2001. Total fertility rate 
(TFR) declined from 5.2 in 1971 to 3.1 in 2001. Life expectancy at birth increased from 
49.7 years over the period 1970-1975 to 63 years during 2000-2004. As discussed above, 
a country‟s demographic transition is reflected in its changing age composition, 
specifically in the share of the working-age population. Over the period 1971-2001, the 
share of the working-age population in total population increased from 52% in 1971 to 
55.5% in 1991, and further to 57.1% in 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Key demographic variables and vital statistics: all-India, 1951-2001 
                                                 
5
This section onwards, the definition of the working-age group is ages 15-59. 
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 Demographic variable 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 
1 Population (in millions) 361 439 548 683 846 1,028 
2 
Average annual growth 
rate of population  
1.98% 2.24% 2.23% 2.16% 1.97% 
3 
Working-age (15-59) 
population (in millions)   
285 367 470 587 
4 
Average annual growth 
rate of working-age 
population 
   
2.58% 2.48% 2.26% 
5 
Share of the working-age 
population in total 
population 
  
52.0% 53.8% 55.5% 57.1% 
6 
Growth in the share of the 
working-age population in 
total population 
   
0.34% 0.31% 0.28% 
7 Crude death rate (CDR) 22.8 19 15 12.5 9.2 7.4 
8 
Infant mortality rate 
(IMR)  
146 129 110 80 66 
9 Crude birth rate (CBR) 41.7 41.2 37.2 33.9 29.5 25.4 
10 Total fertility rate (TFR) 6 5.5 5.2 4.2 3.6 3.1 
 
 
      
 
 
  
(1970-
75) 
(1981-
85) 
(1991-
95) 
(2000-
04) 
11 Life expectancy at birth 
  
49.7 55.5 60.3 63 
Source: Registrar General of India and author calculations. Note: Age group 15-59 is considered as the 
working-age group.  
 
There are various ways to discuss the evolution of demographic trends across states in 
India, such as variations in birth and death rates combined with life expectancy and total 
fertility rates. Differences in key vital statistics across states will be reflected in spatial 
variation in the growth rate of population as well as in the evolution of the age structure.  
For reasons of space, we present only the indicator we are most interested in, i.e., the 
share of the working-age in the total population. Figure 2 shows the share of the working-
age population in total population for 17 major Indian states, and Table 2 shows the 
average annual growth in the share of the working-age population for the same states. In 
discussing the demographic trends in the rest of the paper, we focus only on these 17 
major states.
6
 These 17 states accounted for 97.4 % of India‟s total population and 97.3% 
of the working-age population in 2001, and 93% of the increase in India‟s working-age 
population between 1991 and 2001.  
                                                 
6
 The newly carved states are considered together with their respective parent states, i.e., the newly formed 
states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Uttarakhand are considered together with their respective parent 
states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. 
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A few things stand out in relation to the differences in the evolution of the age structure 
across states. First, the share of the working-age population varies across states. It was 
64% in Kerala and Tamil Nadu in 2001, and only 52% in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in 
2001. 
 
Figure 2: Share of the working-age population in total population: Major Indian 
states, 1971-2026 
 
Source: Registrar General of India and author calculations. Note: For descriptions of state code, please refer 
to Table 2.  
 
Second, over the 30-year period from 1971 to 2001, the four southern states of Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu saw an increase in the share of the working-
age population by 6.7, 8.4, 9.5, and 7.3 percentage points respectively. This is a reflection 
of the decline in the share of the dependent age groups (0-14 and 59-plus). Though not 
shown here, this change is accompanied by a decline in fertility rates, birth and growth 
rates, and an increase in life expectancy in these states. The other states that saw an 
increase in the share of the working-age population are Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, and West Bengal. At the same time, the BIMARU 
states saw a smaller increase in the share of the working-age population. There was only 
a small increase in the share of the working-age population in Delhi, though in this case 
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the share of the working-age population in 1981 was already 61% (higher than any other 
state).  
 
Third, and as shown in Table 2, there is a variation across states in the growth rate of the 
share of the working-age population. A higher growth rate of the share of the working-
age population in total population implies that the growth in the working-age population 
is greater than the growth of the total population. On the one hand, the average annual 
growth in the share of the working-age population in total population from 1971 to 2001 
was virtually zero in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh—which would mean that both the working-
age and the total population increased at the same pace. On the other hand, the average 
annual growth rate of the working-age population in Kerala was 0.54% (for the 30-year 
period 1971-2001).  
 
Table 2: Average annual growth rate of the share of the working-age population (in 
total population): Major Indian states, 1971-2001 
State Code 1971-1981 1981-1991 1991-2001 
Andhra Pradesh AP 0.27% 0.37% 0.54% 
Assam AS 0.65% -0.20% 0.44% 
Bihar BH -0.03% 0.06% -0.08% 
Delhi DL  -0.02% 0.31% 
Gujarat GJ 0.62% 0.36% 0.42% 
Haryana HY 0.73% 0.18% 0.64% 
Himachal Pradesh HP 0.62% 0.63% 0.64% 
Karnataka KK 0.40% 0.47% 0.62% 
Kerala KL 0.69% 0.60% 0.33% 
Madhya Pradesh MP 0.31% 0.20% 0.12% 
Maharashtra MH 0.37% 0.30% 0.32% 
Orissa OR 0.42% 0.45% 0.29% 
Punjab PJ 0.72% 0.30% 0.39% 
Rajasthan RJ 0.18% 0.18% 0.07% 
Tamil Nadu TN 0.35% 0.46% 0.40% 
Uttar Pradesh UP -0.01% 0.10% -0.08% 
West Bengal WB 0.69% 0.18% 0.43% 
Source: Registrar General of India. Note: Age group 15-59 is considered as the working-age group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
5. Growth and demographic change across Indian states: empirical evidence 
Estimation strategy 
Section 2 discussed how the changing age structure can be beneficial for growth. In the 
previous section, we highlighted the differing pace of demographic transition among the 
major states in India. Using data for the major states in India for the period 1971-2001, 
we examine the relationship between economic growth and growth in the share of the 
working-age population. The specification we estimate is as follows: 
 
                                                               
                                                                      
                                                     (1) 
 
where the dependent variable,                , is the average annual growth rate of 
per capita income (as measured by the Net State Domestic Product (NSDP) per capita) 
over the previous 10-year period (t=1981, 1991, 2001).             is the initial 
income per capita at the beginning of each 10-year period, and                       
is the initial share of the working-age population in total population at the beginning of 
each 10-year period.                        , the key variable of interest, is the 
average annual growth rate of the share of the working-age population in total population 
over the previous 10-year period (t=1981, 1991, 2001). In all specifications we include 
dummy variables for each decade (1971-81, 1981-91, 1991-01) to capture any shock in 
each of the three decades that affect all the states. State specific fixed-effects are included 
to control for time-invariant state-specific factors that affect both the dependent variable 
and                        .  
 
However, there may be state-varying and time-varying factors, such as life expectancy 
and literacy, that affect both the dependent variable and our key variable, 
                       . To control for such variables we estimate Equation 1 with 
additional explanatory variables, namely, the index of overall infrastructure, physical 
infrastructure, and social infrastructure. We include these variables one at a time as the 
three are highly correlated. 
 
Data 
We use data from a variety of sources. The data on state-wise population and working-
age population for the years 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001 are from the Registrar General 
of India. The data on various indexes of infrastructure are from Kumar (2002). Per capita 
income at 1999-2000 constant prices is obtained from the Central Statistics Organization 
(Government of India). Official data prior to 1993 and 1980 are indexed to different base 
years and were spliced to 1999-2000 prices.
7
 
                                                 
7
 Delhi is not included in the estimation because there is no data for 1971.  
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Estimation results and discussion 
Estimation results are shown in Table 3. Results from the estimation of equation 1 using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) are shown in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 3. All the estimations 
include state and time dummy variables. In other words, identification comes from 
variation within the states over time. In the first column, we include the initial NSDP per 
capita, the initial share of the working-age population in total population, and the growth 
in the share of the working-age population in total population. In subsequent columns, we 
include state characteristics that vary over time to control for any omitted variable bias 
that may affect both the growth in the share of the working-age population and the 
growth in initial income per capita (i.e., the dependent variable). Robust standard errors 
clustered at the state level are reported. 
 
Table 3: Growth in income per capita and growth in the share of the working-age 
population in total population 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth rate of income per capita  
 Pooled OLS 2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log (Initial income 
per capita) 
-0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.04** -0.07*** -0.04* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Log(Initial share of  
working-age 
population) 
0.37*** 0.37** 0.36** 0.40** 0.65*** 0.56*** 0.62*** 0.64*** 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.05) 
Growth in the share  
of the working-age 
population 
2.53** 2.55** 2.41** 2.69** 2.41** 2.12** 2.28** 2.19** 
(1.07) (1.13) (1.06) (1.15) (1.02) (0.84) (1.05) (1.03) 
Initial overall 
infrastructure   
-0.00 
   
0.02*** 
  
 
(0.01) 
   
(0.00) 
  
Initial physical 
infrastructure  
  
0.00 
   
0.00 
 
  
(0.00) 
   
(0.00) 
 
Initial social 
infrastructure  
   
-0.01 
   
0.02*** 
   
(0.01) 
   
(0.01) 
Constant 0.98*** 0.99*** 0.97*** 1.06*** 1.09*** 0.74*** 1.03*** 0.74*** 
(0.18) (0.23) (0.19) (0.26) (0.22) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21) 
State Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 48 48 48 48 32 32 32 32 
Source: Author‟s estimates. Notes: Specification estimated is shown in equation 1. Robust clustered (at the 
state level) standard errors are reported. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. 
 
Results in Table 3 show that the coefficient on the initial NSDP per capita is negative and 
statistically significant. This suggests that, after controlling for state characteristics, the 
states with a lower initial income per capita grew faster over the period 1971-2001—i.e., 
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we find conditional convergence. Since the coefficients are identified from variation 
within the states, the coefficient on initial income per capita implies that the states which 
are far away from their steady state per capita income grow faster. It might, however, be 
the case that steady state per capita incomes differ across states.
8
 In all cases, we find that 
states with a higher share of the working-age population grow faster.  
 
Turning to our key variable of interest, we find that the coefficient on the growth in the 
share of the working-age population is positive and statistically significant in Columns 1 
through 4 of Table 3.
9
 We do not distinguish between the various channels (discussed 
above) through which a higher growth in the share of the working-age population may 
translate into higher growth.
10
 
 
While all the variables in Columns 1 to 4 are measured at the beginning of each period, 
the main variable of interest—growth in the share of the working-age population in total 
population—is measured over the same time period as the dependent variable, and may 
therefore lead to reverse causality. For example, states with a higher growth in income 
per capita may attract labor from outside the state (note that barriers to labor mobility 
within a country are usually lower than across countries, there may still language 
barriers), inducing a growth in the share of the working-age population. This potential 
source of endogeneity is addressed by instrumenting the growth in the share of the 
working-age population with its one period lagged value. Since we have only three 
periods for our analysis (1971-1981, 1981-1991, and 1991-2001), we lose one-third of 
our sample. Columns 5 to 8 of Table 3 report the two-state least squares (2SLS) 
estimation results, which we find to be quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the ones 
obtained from OLS estimation shown, respectively, in Columns 1 to 4 of Table 3. The 
coefficients on growth in the share of the working-age population are marginally smaller. 
Using data from 1971 to 2001, our estimation results thus show that, after controlling for 
state characteristics, the states with a higher growth in the share of the working-age 
population tend to grow faster. 
 
 
                                                 
8
 If we use estimate equation 1 without state dummy variables, we find that the coefficient on the log of 
initial income per capita is no longer statistically significant. The convergence results are driven by 
variation from within the states over time. The coefficient on our variable of interest, growth in the share of 
the working-age population, remains positive and statistically significant, though the estimated coefficient 
is smaller in magnitude and the statistical significance is lower.  
9
 We also estimate our results using a fixed effects panel estimation methodology and find that our results 
continue to hold. 
10
 In our results in Table 3, we do not include Delhi in the estimation sample. In studies on India it is 
common to exclude Delhi from state-level analysis. If, however, we include Delhi and use an unbalanced 
sample for estimation, we find that our results continue to hold. 
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6. Regional variation in projected demographic changes 
Based on historical data, the results in the previous section show that states with higher 
growth in the share of the working-age population grow faster. This, however, does not 
imply that the states projected to see a higher growth in the share of the working-age 
population will grow faster. This is because favorable population dynamics at best 
present an opportunity and do not guarantee higher future growth. Adequate provision of 
health, education, physical infrastructure, and policies to generate gainful employment 
opportunities are critical to reap the benefits of a growing share of the working-age 
population and to attain a high growth trajectory.  It is, therefore, important to know 
which states are expected to see a higher growth in the share of the working-age 
population, and if these states are in a position to reap the dividends. Demographic 
projections lets the policymakers see the future and gauge the various phases of 
demographic transition. This provides them with an opportunity to prepare for the 
demographic changes and the economic challenges that are likely to accompany these 
phases of transition. We turn to this next. 
 
From 2001 to 2026, the total population in India is projected to grow at an average annual 
rate of 1.2%—from 1.03 billion in 2001 to 1.4 billion in 2026 (Table 4).11 The CBR 
(CDR) is projected to fall from 23.2 (7.5) during the period 2001-2005 to 16.0 (7.2) 
during 2021-2025. The TFR is expected to fall from 3.2 in 1991-2001 to 2.6 in 2006-
2010, and further to 2.0 by 2026. The decline in the TFR and the CBR is expected to lead 
to a fall in the share of the under-15 population, from 35.4% in 2001 to 29.1% in 2011 
and to 23.4% by 2026. At the same time, the declining CDR combined with an increase 
in life expectancy from 65 years for the period 2001-2005 to 71 years for 2021-2025, will 
lead to an increase in the share of the population aged 60 and above, from 6.9% in 2001 
to 8.3% in 2011 and to 12.4% by 2026. The rest of the projected increase in the total 
population between 2001 and 2026 is accounted for by the working-age population, 
whose share in the total population is projected to increase from 57.1% in 2001 to 64.3% 
in 2026. 
 
However, behind the overall changes in the demographic structure lie significant regional 
differences in demographic trends. For example, the CBR is expected to decline in Kerala 
to 12.3 in 2021-2025 from 16.3 in 2001-2005, and in Rajasthan from 27.1 in 2001-2005 
to 16.7 in 2021-2025.
12
 On the other hand, the CDR is projected to decline in Rajasthan 
                                                 
11
 All the statistics discussed in this section are from the Registrar General of India (2006). 
12
 The CBR in some states such as Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Bihar are projected to be even 
higher in 2021-2025 at 20.5, 18.0, and 17.4, respectively. However, these figures are for the newly formed 
states and do not include the carved out portions, whereas the populations statistics discussed are for the 
“old” states, i.e., population numbers for new states combined with their respective parent states. 
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from 7.0 in 2001-2005 to 6.4 in 2021-2025, while in Kerala it is expected to increase 
from 6.8 in 2001-2005 to 7.8 in 2021-2025. The increase in the CDR in Kerala is a 
reflection of the faster increase in the old-age population rather than a deterioration in 
medical services.
13
 This is one of the indicators showing the differences in demographic 
trends across states. Similarly, the TFR is projected to decline in Rajasthan from 3.1 in 
2006-2010 to 2.0 in 2021-2025, while in Kerala it is expected to remain at 1.8 during the 
entire period 2001-2025. Life expectancy in Rajasthan is expected to increase from 67.6 
years in 2006-2010 to 71.4 years in 2021-2025, while in Kerala, it is projected to increase 
from 74.4 years in 2006-2010 to 77 years in 2021-2025. These differences in CBRs, 
CDRs, TFRs, and life expectancy across states reflect themselves in a differing age 
composition as discussed in Section 2.  
 
Table 4: Demographic projections: all-India, 2001-2026 
 Demographic variable 2001 2011 2021 2026 
1 Population (in millions) 1,028 1,192.5 1,339.7 1399.8 
2 
Average annual growth rate of 
population  
1.50% 1.17% 0.88% 
3 
Working-age (15-59) population 
(in millions) 
587 747 860 899.7 
4 
Average annual growth rate of 
working-age population  
2.44% 1.42% 0.91% 
5 
Share of working-age population 
in total population 
57.10% 62.64% 64.19% 64.27% 
6 
Growth in the share of the 
working-age population in total 
population 
 
0.93% 0.25% 0.02% 
Source: Registrar General of India (2006). Note: Age group 15-59 is considered as the working-age group.  
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the population growth rate for the period 2001-2011 and 2011-
2026.
14,15
 The overall population growth over the period 2011-2026 is expected to slow 
                                                 
13
 Kerala is one of the states leading India‟s demographic transition, and has continually performed well on 
various indicators of demography and human development. For example, the infant mortality rate is 
projected to be the lowest in Kerala in 2021-2025 at 8.4. 
14
 As before, the newly carved states are considered together with their respective parent states to maintain 
comparability with census data from 1971, 1981, and 1991. Even if the newly formed states of Jharkhand, 
Chhattisgarh, and Uttarakhand are considered separately, they, in general, exhibit the same demographic 
trends as their respective parent states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. 
15
 Projections are not available for the states of Goa, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Union Territories 
(Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra Nagar and Haveli, Daman and Diu, Lakshadweep, and 
Pondicherry). Together, they accounted for 1.38% of the population in 2001. Though the projections for the 
northeastern states (except Assam) as a group are available, they are not discussed here. The northeastern 
states include Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. These 
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down in all the states compared with the population growth rates over the 10-year period 
1991-2001. The states expected to see their population increase beyond the national 
growth rate over the period 2011-2026 are Delhi, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh (undivided), 
Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh (undivided). The variation in average annual 
growth rates of total population, as measured by the coefficient of variation, has been 
increasing since 1971 and is projected to continue increasing until 2026.
16
  
 
Table 5: Average annual growth rate of total population and contribution to 
population increase: Major Indian states, 2001-2026 
 
Panel A: Average annual growth 
rate of total population 
Panel B: Contribution to the 
projected increase in India's 
population 
 2001-
2011 
2011-
2021 
2021-
2026 
2011-
2026 
(overall) 
2001-
2011 
2011-
2021 
2021-
2026 
2011-
2026 
(overall) 
Andhra Pradesh 1.07% 0.78% 0.55% 0.70% 5.4% 4.8% 4.3% 4.7% 
Assam 1.38% 1.12% 0.82% 1.02% 2.5% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5% 
Bihar 1.63% 1.17% 0.83% 1.05% 12.1% 11.2% 10.5% 11.0% 
Delhi 2.91% 2.87% 2.71% 2.82% 2.9% 4.3% 6.0% 4.8% 
Gujarat 1.54% 1.15% 0.93% 1.07% 5.3% 5.0% 5.3% 5.1% 
Haryana 1.87% 1.44% 1.15% 1.35% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 2.8% 
Himachal Pradesh 1.12% 0.81% 0.57% 0.73% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
Karnataka 1.18% 0.88% 0.63% 0.80% 4.1% 3.8% 3.6% 3.7% 
Kerala 0.82% 0.57% 0.37% 0.50% 1.7% 1.4% 1.2% 1.3% 
Madhya Pradesh 1.74% 1.37% 1.04% 1.26% 9.6% 9.9% 10.0% 9.9% 
Maharashtra 1.52% 1.21% 0.96% 1.13% 9.9% 10.1% 10.7% 10.3% 
Orissa 1.02% 0.79% 0.56% 0.71% 2.5% 2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 
Punjab 1.29% 0.92% 0.67% 0.83% 2.1% 1.9% 1.7% 1.8% 
Rajasthan 1.84% 1.36% 0.97% 1.23% 7.1% 6.9% 6.6% 6.8% 
Tamil Nadu 0.78% 0.50% 0.28% 0.42% 3.2% 2.4% 1.7% 2.2% 
Uttar Pradesh 1.89% 1.56% 1.16% 1.42% 22.7% 24.8% 25.1% 24.9% 
West Bengal 1.11% 0.85% 0.64% 0.78% 5.9% 5.5% 5.4% 5.5% 
Source: Registrar General of India (2006). Note: For purposes of calculating contribution to the increase in 
India‟s total population, increase in total population considered is for the 17 major states shown above. 
 
Of the total projected increase in India‟s total population of 200 million between 2011 
and 2026 (see Panel B of Table 5), Uttar Pradesh accounts for almost 25% of the increase 
                                                                                                                                                 
states together accounted for 1.2% of India‟s total population and 1.2% of India‟s total working-age 
population in 2001, and 1.5% of the increase in India‟s working-age population between 1991 and 2001. 
Thus, these states are very small in terms of their effect on overall population trends discussed here. 
16
 The coefficient of variation has increased from 26% for population growth over the period 1971-1981, to 
34% for growth over the period 1991-2001, and to 50% for growth over the period 2011-2026. 
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(i.e. an absolute increase of 49.8 million), followed by Bihar (11%), Maharashtra 
(10.3%), Madhya Pradesh (10%), and Rajasthan (6.8%).
17
 The BIMARU states are 
expected to account for 52.5% of the increase in total population. On the other hand, the 
southern states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu) will see a decline 
in their contribution to the increase in the total population, contributing only 12% of the 
expected increase in the total population between 2011 and 2026.  
 
A key variable in understanding the impact of population growth on economic growth is 
the changing age structure. Panel A of Table 6 shows that the average annual growth rate 
of the working-age population of major states is projected to slow down between 2011 
and 2026, and that there is a significant difference in the growth rate of the working-age 
population across states. For example, Kerala is expected to see its working-age 
population grow at an average annual rate of 0.29% over the period 2011-2026, while 
Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh are expected to see their working-age population grow at an 
average annual pace of 1.74% and 1.81%, respectively. 
 
Panel B of Table 6 shows the growth rates of the share of the working-age population in 
total population for the major states. Referring back to Figure 2, we find that over the 
period 1971-2001, all the states saw an increase in the share of the working-age 
population in their respective total populations. However, peeping into the future, some 
states will continue to see an increase in the share of the working-age population in their 
respective populations, while the share in other states is projected to start declining by 
2026. Figure 2 shows that the share of the working-age population in total population is 
projected to dip between 2011 and 2021 in Delhi, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, while barely 
changing in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, and increasing in the rest over the same 
period. The southern states are the furthest along in their demographic transition. 
However, between 2021 and 2026, all states—except the BIMARU states and Haryana— 
are expected to see a decline in the share of their working-age population. The increase in 
the share of the working-age population is the fastest in the BIMARU states. 
 
Panels A and B of Table 6 show that the demographic transition is the slowest in a 
handful of states. These states are also projected to see the fastest increase in the growth 
of the share of the working-age population in total population. This is reflected in the 
contribution of these states to the increase in the working-age population in India 
between 2011 and 2026 (see Panel C Table 6). While the southern states contributed 24% 
of the increase in India‟s working-age population between 1981 and 1991, they are 
projected to contribute only 9% of the increase in India‟s working-age population 
between 2011 and 2026. On the other hand, the BIMARU states, which accounted for 
39% of the increase in the working-age population between 1981 and 1991, are expected 
                                                 
17
 The increase of 200 million is for the 17 states considered here. 
 20 
to contribute as much as 58% of the increase in India‟s working-age population. Further, 
Uttar Pradesh (defined to include Uttarakhand as well) alone is projected to contribute the 
most—25.5%—to the increase in India‟s working-age population. From Panel B of Table 
6, we see that Haryana and Maharashtra are the two other states expected to see an 
increase in the share of the working-age population over the entire period 2011-2026. 
Haryana is projected to contribute 3.1% and Maharashtra, 10.2% of the increase in 
India‟s working-age population. 
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Table 6: Growth rate of the working-age population, share of the working-age population in total population and contribution 
to increase in India’s working-age population: Major Indian states, 2001-2026 
 
Panel A: Average annual growth 
rate of working-age population 
Panel B: Average annual growth 
in the share of working-age 
population in total population 
Panel C: Contribution to the 
projected increase in India's 
working-age population 
 
2001-
2011 
2011-
2021 
2021-
2026 
2011-
2026 
2001-
2011 
2011-
2021 
2021-
2026 
2011-
2026 
2001-
2011 
2011-
2021 
2021-
2026 
2011-
2026 
Andhra Pradesh 1.96% 0.83% 0.32% 0.66% 0.89% 0.06% -0.22% -0.04% 6.3% 4.4% 2.5% 3.9% 
Assam 2.53% 1.38% 0.76% 1.17% 1.14% 0.26% -0.06% 0.15% 2.8% 2.6% 2.2% 2.5% 
Bihar 3.02% 1.81% 1.03% 1.55% 1.37% 0.64% 0.20% 0.49% 12.8% 13.8% 12.5% 13.5% 
Delhi 3.97% 2.81% 2.41% 2.67% 1.03% -0.06% -0.29% -0.14% 2.7% 3.7% 5.5% 4.2% 
Gujarat 2.24% 1.33% 0.80% 1.16% 0.69% 0.19% -0.12% 0.08% 4.9% 4.9% 4.6% 4.8% 
Haryana 3.13% 1.85% 1.30% 1.66% 1.24% 0.40% 0.15% 0.32% 2.8% 3.0% 3.4% 3.1% 
Himachal Pradesh 1.93% 0.95% 0.48% 0.79% 0.81% 0.14% -0.09% 0.06% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 
Karnataka 1.99% 0.92% 0.46% 0.76% 0.80% 0.04% -0.18% -0.03% 4.5% 3.4% 2.5% 3.2% 
Kerala 1.07% 0.42% 0.04% 0.29% 0.24% -0.15% -0.33% -0.21% 1.4% 0.9% 0.1% 0.7% 
Madhya Pradesh 2.75% 1.81% 1.26% 1.63% 0.99% 0.44% 0.22% 0.37% 8.9% 10.5% 11.6% 10.8% 
Maharashtra 2.39% 1.42% 0.97% 1.27% 0.86% 0.20% 0.01% 0.14% 9.8% 10.0% 10.6% 10.2% 
Orissa 2.01% 0.98% 0.39% 0.78% 0.97% 0.19% -0.17% 0.07% 3.0% 2.4% 1.5% 2.2% 
Punjab 2.22% 1.02% 0.65% 0.90% 0.92% 0.11% -0.01% 0.07% 2.3% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 
Rajasthan 3.08% 1.96% 1.31% 1.74% 1.22% 0.58% 0.34% 0.50% 6.9% 7.9% 8.5% 8.1% 
Tamil Nadu 1.09% 0.36% -0.05% 0.22% 0.31% -0.14% -0.32% -0.20% 2.9% 1.5% -0.3% 1.0% 
Uttar Pradesh 3.00% 1.92% 1.59% 1.81% 1.09% 0.36% 0.42% 0.38% 20.2% 23.4% 31.2% 25.5% 
West Bengal 2.18% 0.94% 0.20% 0.70% 1.06% 0.10% -0.43% -0.08% 7.4% 5.3% 1.7% 4.4% 
Source: Registrar General of India (2006). Note: Age group 15-59 is considered as the working-age group. For the purposes of calculating the contribution of the 
various states to the increase in India‟s total working-age population, increase in India‟s working-age population is the sum of the increase in the working-age 
population for the 17 major states shown above. 
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Table 7: State characteristics and demographic dividend 
 
Source: Growth rate in the share of the working-age population is based on population projection data from Registrar General of India (2006). Per capita income and its growth 
rate is based on data from Central Statistical Organization (Government of India). Literacy rate, life expectancy, and infant mortality rate are from various editions of Economic 
Survey (Ministry of Finance, Government of India). Ranking of physical infrastructure is based on Kumar (2002). Investment Climate is from the 2002 edition of “How are the 
States Doing?”. Labor force participation rate (LFPR) and Workforce participation rate (WFPR) are from the 61st round of NSS (National Sample Survey, 2004-2005). 
Notes: Data on infant mortality rate for Delhi and Himachal Pradesh is for 2008. Data on life expectancy for Delhi is for 2001-2005 and Himachal Pradesh is for 2000-2004. 
Investment climate is for the divided states in the case of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. LFPR and WFPR from the 61
st
 round of household survey data are applied to 
the 2006 population projections to get state level estimates which combine rural and urban as well male and female data and to combine new states with their parent states. 
 
Average 
annual 
growth in  the 
share of the 
working-age 
population 
(2011-2026) 
per capita 
income 
(2007-08, 
current 
prices in 
Rupees) 
Average 
annual 
growth in 
per capita 
income 
(1971-2007) 
Literacy 
rate 
(2001) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth (in 
years) 
Infant 
mortality 
Rate 
(2007) 
Rank-
physical 
infrastructure 
Investm-
ent 
climate 
LFPR 
WFPR 
narrow 
WFPR 
broad 
Rajasthan 0.50% 23933 2.68% 61.0% 62 65 13 1.6 438 372 433 
Bihar 0.49% 13279 1.75% 47.5% 61.6 58 16 0.4 340 304 333 
Uttar Pradesh 0.38% 16862 1.99% 57.4% 60 69 12 1.4 370 308 366 
Madhya Pradesh 0.37% 19923 1.61% 64.1% 58 72 15 1.8 446 415 441 
Haryana 0.32% 58531 3.62% 68.6% 66.2 55 4 2.5 409 318 397 
Assam 0.15% 21464 1.90% 64.3% 58.9 66 17 1.5 396 337 383 
Maharashtra 0.14% 47051 3.77% 77.3% 67.2 34 2 2.3 470 435 460 
Gujarat 0.08% 45773 3.73% 66.4% 64.1 52 5 2.4 466 415 460 
Orissa 0.07% 23403 2.70% 63.6% 59.6 71 10 1.7 462 381 433 
Punjab 0.07% 44923 2.83% 70.0% 69.4 41 1 2.9 432 318 413 
Himachal Pradesh 0.06% 40137 2.77% 76.5% 66.5 44 11 2.3 533 451 522 
Karnataka -0.03% 36266 3.61% 67.0% 65.3 47 7 2.7 493 468 487 
Andhra Pradesh -0.04% 35864 3.78% 61.1% 64.4 54 8 2.3 509 484 502 
West Bengal -0.08% 31722 3.05% 69.2% 64.9 37 14 1.2 395 341 380 
Delhi -0.14% 78690 3.05% 81.8% 72.2 35 9 3.1 349 327 333 
Tamil Nadu -0.20% 40757 3.51% 73.5% 66.2 35 3 3.1 485 462 474 
Kerala -0.21% 41814 3.33% 90.9% 74 13 6 2.8 446 339 393 
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Will India be able to reap the demographic dividend? 
The BIMARU states, which together account for 40% of India‟s population, are projected 
to contribute 52.5% of the increase in India‟s total population, and 58% of the increase in 
India‟s working-age population. These four states are the slowest in their pace of 
transition to low birth rates and low death rates. Using data for 1971-2001, we have 
shown that the states with a higher growth in the share of the working-age population 
tend to grow faster.  
 
We use the past performance of Indian states, especially the BIMARU states, to reflect on 
whether they will be able to deal with the challenge of a huge bulge in the working-age 
population. We examine the performance of the 17 major states on various indicators 
such as income per capita growth over the period 1971-2007, per capita income in 2007, 
infrastructure, indicators of investment climate, and employment creation. Table 7 
summarizes these indicators.  
 
The states in Table 7 are ordered, from highest to lowest, according to the growth rate in 
the share of the working-age population over the period 2011-2026. The BIMARU states 
are at the top of the table, indicating that they are the ones expected to see a more 
favorable change in the age structure of their populations from 2011 to 2026. As shown 
in Table 7, the BIMARU states are also the ones with the lowest per capita income and 
the slowest growth over the period 1971-2007. They are also the states that perform 
poorly on various accounts of physical and social infrastructure, as well as rank low on 
account of investment climate. 
 
Table 7 also shows the labor force participation rate (LFPR) and workforce participation 
rate (WFPR) for the major states using data from the 61
st
 round of the National Sample 
Survey. The officially reported statistics of employment includes those working full time 
or part time. The WFPR based on both full-time workers (WFPR narrow) and full- and 
part-time workers (WFPR broad) are shown. Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, two of the 
BIMARU states, have the lowest LFPR. When considering full-time employment only 
(WFPR narrow), which is a better indicator of full-time gainful employment 
opportunities, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh have the lowest WFPR. A low WFPR (based on 
the narrow definition of employment) is an indicator of the lack of full-time gainful 
employment opportunities in these two states. It also shows that the two states—which 
together are projected to contribute 39% of the increase in the working-age population—
face a daunting challenge in terms of putting the working-age population to work. 
 
In short, the creation of gainful employment opportunities in the BIMARU states is 
important to make the maximum use of the demographic dividend. Kochhar et al. (2006) 
argue that policy reforms implemented since the 1980s have given way to multiple 
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Indias. They argue that in the post-1980s period, the performance across states has varied 
with state characteristics such as institutional quality, investment climate, labor laws, and 
product market regulations.  
 
The slow-growing states face competition from the fast-growing states not only because 
they are geographically disadvantaged by being landlocked, but also because the 
footloose skilled labor in the slow-growing states—necessary in any labor-intensive 
industry as well—could be absorbed by the fast-growing states. Rajan and Subramanian 
(2006) call this the “Bangalore Bug,” akin to the “Dutch Disease,” with the skill-based 
services playing the role of the natural resource sector. An increase in the demand for 
skilled labor from the services sector causes the wages for skilled labor to go up in the 
economy as a whole. This is likely to squeeze the profitability of the manufacturing 
sector and, in a sector characterized by externalities, this may affect the overall growth of 
the sector. This will also affect the laggard states disproportionately because these states 
are in the hinterland and are behind in all the indicators of infrastructure. The fast- 
growing states, with adequate provision of social and physical infrastructure as well as 
institutional support, are the ones that are likely to attract both unskilled labor- intensive 
and skilled labor-intensive manufacturing. The fast-growing states can potentially attract 
whatever skilled labor is available in the laggard states, further hampering the growth of 
manufacturing sector in these states. This will seriously inhibit the ability of the 
BIMARU states to create employment for its working-age population.
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The fate of the laggard states, which are also expected to see a faster increase in the 
working-age population, may very well lie in their own hands. The solution may lie in 
implementing policies—such as product and labor market reforms, improving 
institutional quality and governance, and the provision of adequate social (health and 
education) and physical (electricity and roads) infrastructure—that will attract new 
investment and help absorb the vast pool of the young population that will be available to 
them in the coming years. The growing population in the four laggard states will also 
require the implementation of appropriate family welfare programs and health policies 
not only for the purposes of population control, but also to meet the needs of a young 
population.  
 
The ability of the BIMARU states—and therefore of India—to make the most of the 
much talked about demographic dividend will critically depend on the ability of these 
states to provide the right supporting environment that will help generate gainful job 
                                                 
18
 Eichengreen and Gupta (2010) argue that it is no longer obvious that manufacturing is the main 
destination for the vast majority of Indian labor moving into the modern sector or that modern services are 
only a viable destination for the highly skilled few. In other words, services sector along with the 
manufacturing sector has potential to absorb vast surplus labor and also provide jobs for the unskilled labor. 
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opportunities to absorb the young population. These states, as shown above, are likely to 
account for 58% of the increase in India‟s working-age population. Whether the 
BIMARU states will be able to create conducive conditions to provide the millions of the 
young working-age population with jobs remains an open question. Our discussion above 
suggests that in their current form, the BIMARU states may impede India‟s ability to 
make full use of the demographic window of opportunity. While sitting on a huge 
dividend, these states also face the prospects of turning a boon into a bane, as 
unemployment may in turn take the form of social unrest. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The impact of population growth on economic growth has always been of keen interest, 
and the debate seemed to have settled in favor of no-impact of population growth on 
economic development once other country characteristics are taken into account. Bloom 
and William (1998), among others, however, argue that it is not population growth per se, 
but the changing age structure that has an impact on the long-term economic prospects of 
a country. According to this view, as a country passes through various phases of 
demographic transition, there is an increase in the share of the working-age population in 
total population. This bulge has the potential to enhance a country‟s growth prospects, 
which could be realized if a suitable policy environment is provided. 
 
This paper examines variations in the demographic transition across major sates in India. 
We find that some states such as Karnataka and Kerala are well ahead of other states, 
specifically the BIMARU states, in demographic transition. Using a cross-state database 
on per capita income and the working-age population from 1971 to 2001, we find that, 
after controlling for state fixed effects, states with a higher growth in the share of the 
working-age population in total population grew faster over that period. 
 
Using demographic projections until 2026, we show that differences in the pace of 
demographic transition are likely to increase over the next few years. On the one hand, 
some states such as Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu are projected to 
see a decline in their share of the working-age population in total population. On the 
other hand, the BIMARU states are likely to see a continuing increase in the share of the 
working-age population in total population, and will account for as much as 58% of the 
increase in India‟s working-age population. 
 
Therefore, India‟s ability to make full use of its demographic window of opportunity will 
critically depend on the ability of the four BIMARU states to generate gainful 
employment opportunities for the expected bulge in the working-age population in their 
respective states. However, these four states are also the ones that have grown slowly, 
have the lowest per capita income, as well as perform poorly on various accounts of 
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social and physical infrastructure, investment climate, and employment generation. The 
fate of a significant proportion of India‟s working-age population may therefore depend 
on how fast and to what extent the BIMARU states reform themselves. Failure of these 
states to attract new investment and to generate new employment opportunities may turn 
India‟s demographic boon into a bane. 
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